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PRELIMINARY MEMORANDUM 
October 26, 1979 Conference 
List 3, Sheet 1 
No. 79-136 
PARKER (Comm. of 
Patents) 
Cert to U.S. Ct. of Customs 
v. 
& Patent Appls (Rich, Markey, 
& Lane; Baldwin, concurring; 
Miller, dissenting) 
BERGY, et al. Federal/Civil Timely (w/ ex t 
a living organism 1. SUMMARY: The sole issue presented is whether 
is patentable subject matter under 35 u.s.c. § 101.1/ --------2. FACTS: This is a consolidated case in which the Court of Custom 
1/ 
35 u.s.c. § 101 provides: 
"Whoever inve nts or discover s any new and 
useful process , machine, ma nufacture, or compo-
sition of matter, o r a ny new and use f ul improve-
ment thereof, may obtain a patent ther e fore, sub-
ject to the conditions a nd requi rement s o f this 
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& Patent Appeals reversed decisions denying resps' applications for 
patents in living bacteria in biologically pure cultures. In so doing, 
the court affirmed its earlier judgments holding that such bacteria is 
patentable under 35 u.s.c. § 101. A petition for cert in the first of 
"----"""" 
these cases (Bergy) had been granted by this Court on June 26, 1978. The 
judg~ent of the Court of Customs & Patent Appeals was vacated, and the 
decision remanded "for further consideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 
437 U.S. 584." 438 U.S. 902, No. 77-1503. On August 25, 1978, a peti-
tion for cert in the second case (Chakrabarty, No. 78-145) was dismissed 
pursuant to stipulation by the parties after the Ct. of Customs & Patent 
Appeals vacated its earlier judgment, recalled its mandate, and restored 
the appeal to the calendar. 
The microorganism in Bergy is "capable of producing the antibiotic 
- ----~ 
lincomycin in a recoverable quantity upon fermentation in an aqueous 
...... -
nutrient medium containing assimilable sources of carbon, nitrogen and 
inorganic substances." In Chakrabarty, it aids in getting rid of oil 
spills by breaking down or degrading components of the . oil into simpler 
substances that serve as its food. Although the Ct. of Customs & Patent 
Appeals did not formally consolidate the cases, it heard them together 
because they presented "the same single question of law." 
3. DECISION BELOW: In construing the meaning of "manufacture" and 
"composition of matter" under 35 u.s.c. § 101, the Ct. of Customs & 
Patent Appeals concluded that Flook was unrelated to the issue before 
it. The court initially examined the statutory scheme in relation to its 
constitutional purpose, stating that Flook is "an unfortunate and appar-
ently unconscious, though clear, commingling of distinct statutory pro-
visions which are conceptually unrelated .• II It distinguished Flook 
on the ground that Flook was concerned with the question of what is a 
- -- 3 -=• "process" under§ 101, in the context of computer program protection, and 
that its holding -- "that a claim for an improved method of calculation, 
even when tied to a specific end use, is unpatentable subject matter 
under§ 101" -- has no bearing on the instant case. It further observed 
that although this Court in Flook noted that patents may not be obtained 
in "principles, laws of nature, mental processes, intellectual concepts, 
ideas, natural phenomena, mathematical formulae, methods of calcu l ation, 
fundamental truths, original causes, motives, the Pythagorean theorum, 
and the computer-implementable method claims of Benson and Tabbot," the 
instant case does not involve an attempt to patent any of these things. 
Rather, the court characterized resps' microorganisms as advancements in 
a new field of technology or useful art that falls within the statutory 
• 1......,. · subject matter of§ 101. The dissent argued that the thrust of Flook is that although Congress 
could not foresee all new developments in technology and thus§ 101 
should be broadly construed, in cases in which "there is a basis for sub-
stantial doubt over the intent of Congress regarding the breadth of the 
language in the statute, the Court will await a 'clear and certain signal 
from Congress' on the subject." He further argued that in light of the 
Plant Patent Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970 
there is substantial doubt concerning whether organisms or microorganisms 
developed by inventors were intended by Congress to be embraced by the 
words "manufacture" or "composition of matter." He noted that if Con-
gress had intended to include organisms within§ 101, such legislation 
would have been unnecessary. The Plant Patent Act provides for patent 
e protection of certain kinds of asexually-reproduced plants; the Plant 
Variety Protection Act gives the Secreta ry of Agriculture a uthority to 
issue certificates of plant v a riety protection, similar to patents, for 
- -
- 4 -
• new varieties of asexually-reproduced plants. At the time the latter act 
was passed, a House report stated that "Under patent law, protection is 
presently limited to those varieties of plants which reproduce asexually 
••• " that is, protection under the Plant Patent Act. 
re 
~ 
4. CONTENTIONS: The SG contends that in concluding that living 
things are patentable subject matter, the Ct. of Customs & Patent Appeals 
has significantly extended the coverage of the patent laws without legis----------~- - ~ lative authorization, and rejected the principles of construction of the 
patent law articulated in Flook. He argues initially that the decision 
below is the first to hold that living things themselves are patentable; 
this holding opens up a vast new area to patentability, even if it ap-
plies only to microorganisms. As this Court noted in Flook, courts "must 
proceed cautiously when ••• asked to extend patent rights into areas 
wholly unforeseen by Congress." 
The SG also argues that living things -- whether naturally occurring, 
isolated, or genetically engineered -- are no more "discoveries" of the 
kind the statute was enacted to protect than are the mathematical prin-
ciples involved in Flook. He suggests they are more like discoveries of 
laws of nature -- discoveries that under Flook cannot be patented. 
Finally, the SG argues that Congress did not intend to include living 
things within ~he scope of the general patent laws. This argument is 
based on the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Protection Act. It 
essentially repeats the argument of the dissent in the Ct. of Claims. 
Both resps argue that the SG has mischaracterized the issue by 
phrasing it in terms of whether life itself is patentable. Resp Bergy 
notes that many patents issued by the Patent & Trademark Office (PTO) 
involve protection of "living things." (Examples -- such as dry baker' s 
viable yeast, a "living microorganism" -- are cited at pp. 66a-67a of 
=-
~ 
- -- 5 -
the petition for cert.) Thus, as noted by the Ct. of Customs & Patent 
Appeals, "It is not possible to reconcile the assertion that we are 'ex-
panding' patent law to cover living things with the PTO's issuance of the 
foregoing patents." 
Both resps also argue that the decision below is not inconsistent 
with Flook. Both initi~lly repeat the distinctions made by the Ct. of 
Customs & Patent Appeals. Resp Chakrabarty also argues: (1) the instant 
case involves man-made bacteria not found in nature and thus, unlike in 
~look, there is no law of nature being withdrawn from the public by 
patent protction, {2} this case does not involve an expansion of the 
patent law because living things have previously been granted patent pro-
tection; indeed, the SG's position -- that the invention not be alive --
would result in a restriction into the scope of patent laws, and (3) the 
instant case does not overrule or modify past precedents. 
Finally, resps argue the Plant Patent Act and the Plant Variety Pro-
tection Act do not support petr's position. They agree with the court 
below that the history of these acts is inconclusive on the issue of con-
gressional intent with respect to§ 101. Resp Chakrabarty also argues 
that it does not follow from the congressional enactment of these acts 
that Congress believed "living things" were excluded from paten t protec-
tion. As was indicated in the House and Senate reports on the 1952 codi-
fication of the Patent Code, manufacture under 35 u.s.c. § 101 "may in-
clude anything under the sun that is made by man." 
5. DISCUSSION: Although I profess no expertise in either patent law 
or microbiology, I think the issue presented is important. I do not, 
however, think it warrants the attention of this Court at this time. The 
~ Ct. of Custom & Patent Appeals' decision is extremely thorough and c a re-




- -- 6 -
complex. Although the SG claims that review at this time is appropriate 
in order to avoid further complicating the already highly controversial 
policy problems surrounding genetic engineering, it would seem preferable 
to examine such problems in a case that actually presents them rather 
than in a case, such as this one, which can be construed as applying only 
to microorganisms. The issue was one of first impression before the Ct. 
of Customs & Patent Appeals, and thus there is no conflict or inconsis-
tencies at this time. Finally, the conclusion reached by the court below 
is well-supported and does not seem to be incorrect. 
I would deny. 
There are responses. 
10/11/79 
CMS 
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Motion of Bergy to Dismiss 
and Vacate as to Bergy, 
et al., 
U.S. Ct. of Customs 
and Patent Appeals 
Resps Bergy, et al., have abandoned the patent application 
~
involved in this case. The case has therefore become moot and 
resµ;ask the Court to vacate the Bergy judgment and remand to the 
court bel.ow with directions to dismiss as moot. 
The SG agrees, but notes that this action will have no effect 
on the companion case, Diamond v. Chakrabarty, which remains pending 
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JURISDICTIONAL 
STATEMENT 
N I POST I DIS I AFF 
MERITS 
REV I AFF 
\ 
MOTIO\ 
G D 1 
. .. 1\ ... 
.. . J.J. .. 
G-
ABSENT NOT VOTING 
••••I• • , ol• • • • • •• • • •I• •• ••••••• 
-
~./3 -~ ~~~~ ~ 
~ ~/4-<!) ~ w,.-U ~~lf· 
DOS J4 ·, ~ ~.u. trf ~ E., ,a.,,~ ~ ~ ~Ar'~ 
)1-d-4-,._,-i-~ ~ ,~ ,. . 
~ ~ ~ ,ri..,.(, ~, -~ lkt:. g,. ,.:,aza+at• .. , 
TO: 
~ A.t:J_ rt /J ~/44 /4.L4 ,e,l__ ,-----•~~[A 
Ol~-l~v--/JttLk-..J-~ -~ ~ ~ 
BENCH MEMORANDUM ?t-'~rf ~ -
a lf~ frt.~··u.-~)uA.-~ · 
Mr. Justice Powell A-.R_. ~~,ty~ ... ,,~....-ti-~J de•Y«..J. 
1-- · ~ A.J.. P4. ~.J,1.✓,.,. .... ~_ lfk-.,~:.t ~ HA-\. 
FROM: David tf"V' ~.J1u:t-
d,I~~~ . ~ J-;-~I..Ah 
DATE: March 13, 1986:;:· 1-,~ ~4".~'-"'"- '¢ ~L«-<A-~ , .. 1ii 
RE: 
~SI~/. CCPA ~~""' '~~ 
No. 79-136, Dfamo-nd ·v. ""thakrabarty ,.,,,, ,-<{ -
~ ~ ~kU-~ 6... ~~ 
~- (( ~~ #,~ f-:,,-~~ 
Question Presented: 6./ 1 #-f~ ': ~l~'-1(~ 
~J~..-,._~ .. ~lw<._~~~• I 
Cc. PA ~·..J- ~-k-<- ~., + u,o)l'A'i 
Is a 1 iving organism a patentable subject matter under 3 5 
:,,. ~ l:.e..t..,•1 ~ 4~.y ( .tL. ~~~ u.s.c. § 101? 
- u..--~,.,._-u.~~~ ... ~ ~~~~ . .. ~-P~&u..r- --~~~~ Statutory provision: ,")-c I ~ ~ • • J_ ,,-__ .~.-,I~_~ . ,_J . _ A 11 4~••<-A-1'- 4e, -~1,'4A..1~,., • ~ .
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, 
~~ '~P'>Alf"•'~"""",, ..... • « . 
machine, manuracture, or composition of matter, or any n~~zul 
. t h f .~q'k ,-.,~ ,_._f rre&.b' t th~ improvemen t ereo , may ob/aifi a patent t ere or, su Jee to e 
conditions and rec{f{';l::!fs of this title." 35 U.S.C. § 101 
fr~~ ,i.,,(..() ,rtZ~4.4.,,c,•••··~. 1-k.. 
~~~~-~ 9~- u-:1-~~~ 
/l~ ~. t!hu_ ~ k ~ ~I(~,.,,,.-
(emphasis added). 
Background: ~~"' ~ · ~ 61 ~ ~ '-4.-1 ~ N /? ~·· u., • .A, ~ ~ C C p /-1 d.<!4 lle--
Hv- 1, ~trf ~/.u..,..lt ''~~cc p A~ 
By inserting two "plasmids," or chromosome-carrying ~ ~ 
unu.-, 
entities, into a bacterium, Chakrabarty succeeded in enhancing that~cr-/ 
bacterium's ~bility to consume the component chemicals in petroleum. ~ 
- ,-~-- - --- - --====---
~ -f ~ 1 ;c,c...- ',wd,l ~ ~, 
~ 1..~ ::!;:_._f-f;:'J~ ~~~A.,~ 
- - 2. 
The intended end-use of this "new" microorganism is to clean up oil 
- spills in the ocean. Chakrabarty and his employer, the General f~ 
Electric Co., sought a patent. The patent examiner denied the 
request on the ground that these microorganisms were "products of 
nature." The Board of Patent Appeals affirmed his ruling, but 
changed the ground of decision to the fact that the microorganism was 
a living thing and thus not within§ 101. This change of theory may 
' • ,_,. -- I 
prove significant for this case. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (CCPA) reversed, 
applying its ruling in Bergy, a companion case since mooted, that§ 











and the case remanded for reconsideration in 1 ight of Parker v. ~ -
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), which found that a mathematical algorith~~ 
used for computer programming was a "product of nature" and thus notJ,4,4-~~ 
-patentable. The CCPA reacted peevishly to the remand. In Bergy, the 
companion case, it produced a twenty-page denunciation of Flook, 
concluding that the ruling was irrelevant to the patentability of 
-
1 if e forms. 
Bergy and 
'-,. 
. ( . 
certiorari. 
The CCPA then again found that the microorganisms in 
in this case are patentable. This Court granted 
The Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks argues that - -living things cannot be patented. 
Discussion: 
a case. 
For perhaps the first time this year, I have no firm view of 
The questions involved are large, complex, and center on 
matters that I have no background in: biochemistry and patent law. 
- - 3. 
One of the difficult features of the case is the direct confrontation 
-between the CCPA and this Court after Flook. I think there may be a 
serious question whether the CCPA has followed the directions of this 
Court on remand. The issues raised in this petition seem too 
important to let them be submerged by a dispute over execution of 
this Court's instructions on a remand, but then again adherence to 
the instructions of a superior court is not a trivial matter in its 
own right. 
The SG's argument in favor of reversal contains two 
incompatible halves. On the first hand, the SG urges that the --------dangers presented by genetic engineering are so grave that this Court 
cannot allowed engineered microorganisms to be patented. By 
providing commercial protection for those "inventions," the SG 
continues, the Court will accelerate the blind, stupid rush of 
- genetic experimentation and its attendant dangers of disease and 
depletion or distortion of the world's gene pool, as well as the 
ethical quandaries presented by the manipulation of evolution and 
-
synthetic fabrication of both life and intelligence. For an eloquent ( 
I recommend the amicus brief of the description of these dangers, 
People's Business Commission. I share these concerns. In 
particular, I agree that genetic technology carries implications that 
the people of this country and its policymakers have not really 
considered. As I will discuss, the scientific definition of life is 
a tricky business. The best I have seen in this case came from the 
National Academy of Sciences, pinpointing the ability to reproduce 
and to create mutants in reproduction ( in other words, evolution). 
Genetic engineering clearly creates the potential for human beings to 
- - 4. 
supplant that natural process. 
esuch power. 
I wonder if we can be trusted with 
However compelling these considerations are to me on a 
personal level, they seem irrelevant to this case. The question is flu_ (5g 
whether the microorganism created by Chakrabarty is within the patent 
policy articulated by Congress under the patent clause of the 
Constitution. The factors raised by the SG are more properly S 6-..:r 
addressed to a legislative body that would establish the parameters ---of the national patent policy. This Court is not equipped to decide 
such issues either as a functional matter or as a question of 
distribution of powers under the Constitution. Consequently, I would 




The ~G's second li~f argu~nt focuses on the Plant Patent~ 
Act of 1930 and the Plant Variety Act of 1970. The first statute t!,,_,;,_.,~'1 
eper~he patenting of hybrid plants that reproduce asexually, ~ 
while the second granted protection to new plant strains that 
-
reproduce sexually. The SG argues that Congress had to enact both I 
statutes because it believed that living things were not covered by 
the general patent provision, now § 101. Resp disputes this 
superficially appealing interpretation with the argument that what 
Congress was responding to was the "product of nature" doctrine. 
Because plants were viewed as "products of nature" just as 
minerals are products of nature -- Congress had to extend the patent 
laws to reach plants. 
There is no persuasive legislative history on this dispute. 
Certainly, there is no direct evidence that any of the congressmen 
considered the patentability of microorganisms in 1930 or 1970.Both 
' - - 5. 
sides cite statements by legislators and administrators that either 
eare ambiguous or were not clearly before Congress. The only hard 
fact we have is that before 1930, the Patent and Trademark Office 
(PTO) refused to patent plants. We do not know why. ( Resp also 
attempts to argue that the PTO has regularly patented microorganisms 
such as yeast, but I believe that the SG effectively refutes this 
contention in his reply brief.) Basically, I think the parties 
battle to a draw on this issue.Which leads to a battle of maxims. 
The SG insists, based on language in Deepsouth Packing Corp. v. 
Laitram, 406 U.S. 518 (1972), which was quoted prominently in Flook, 
that this Court should not rush headlong into an extension of the 
patent laws in the absence of any convincing proof that Congress 
intended coverage of living organisms under those laws. The 
statement in Deepsouth clearly can be distinguished because the Court 
-there was declining to overrule its previous precedent. But Flook I 
Thus, the involved a matter of first impression, as does this case. 
Court's conservative position in Flook, based on the Deepsouth dicta, 
may in fact be transferrable to this case. Respondent's counter- \__ 
maxim, however, is squarely based on a simple view of the national 
patent pol icy. The Constitution and Congress have ordered that new 
inventions be patented. The obvious presumption is to foster the 
"useful arts." The policy includes no normative or ethical 
judgments. 
patented. 
Chakrabarty has invented something. Th us, it should be 
Again, I do not find either side's position especially 
compelling or silly. Consequently, I think it may be appropriate to 
~ --
-consider the more practical ramifications of either outcome in this 
- - ~ 6. 
case. Respondent and various amici argue that patents are required 
-in order to keep the nation's biotechnology competitive with the rest 
of the world. Indeed, it does appear that the Japanese patent laws 
and the European patent convention recognize patents for 
microorganisms. -- The SG counters that if you patent microorganisms, you will create a slippery slope that will inevitably permit 
patenting of higher life forms, including humanoids. I question this 
\:£: 
argument. Several amici argue 
terrifyingly, that the distinction 
persuasively, and somewhat \~/~ 
between 1 if e and non-1 ife is ~ · ---------------------extremely arbitrary, at the margin. ------ ~ Once you get down to viruses and 
viroids, there is no reliable indicator of what is alive and not 
alive. Therefore, it seems possible that a line drawn between 
microorganisms and "macro"-organisms -- based perhaps on the Japanese 
or European examples -- need not be any more irrational than the line 
-between life and non-life. Such a line, of course, is most properly 
-
drawn by a legislature, not a court. Indeed, for this Court to do so 
here would reek of the "first trimester" line of Roe v. -wade without 
the question actually being before the Court. But it is not obvious 
that the SG's life/non-life line -- whatever its intuitive appeal --
is the only possible boundary. 
In the end, I find myself wondering what would be the most J#W' 
~f-1-o 
effective method of bringing the issue before Congress, because I 
believe that Congress is the proper forum for its resolution (and, ~ 
indeed, for consideration of 21_11 the exciting and scary features of~ 
biotechnology). Reversal of the CCPA would most 1 ikely bring the 
biotechnicians down on Congress like the Furies, and could well 
result in legislative action. Affirmance seems less likely to induce 
- - 7. 
that result. The "go-slow" point of view is represented only by the 
-Administration, which has been notoriously ineffectual in legislative 
<., ..2 
matters and could be replaced~ another Administration with 
different views, and by the People's Business Commission, which 
likely has little clout in the halls of Congress. 
A final option is proposed by amici Hood, Maniatis, The 
American Society of Biological Chemists, The Association of American 
Medical Colleges, the California Institute of Technology, and the S"" -c!--<-
American Council On Education (the g___reen brief). They argue that ~ 
the question initially decided by the patent examiner was whether ~ 
Chakrabarty's bacteria were a product of nature. They continue that 
this court vacated and remanded the CCPA ruling after Flook, 
presumably for consideration of the product of nature issue, which 
was the only question discussed in Flook. The CCPA did not address 





direct the energies of the biotechnicians to Congress would be to 
remand to the CCPA for review of the product of nature question and 
to include blunt dictum to the effect that this is a legislative 
question. It is, of course, grotesque to extend this already lengthy 
litigation (Chakrabarty filed his patent application in 1972). A 
possible obstacle to this outcome is the SG's position. He does not 
argue that Chakrabarty has merely discovered a product of nature. It 
is not clear whether the SG would concede that point, and admit that 
the bacteria are a genuine invention. If he would, then this 
strategy evaporates. If he challenges its reality as a product of 
nature, the course might work. I would point out, in addition, that 





- - 8. 
product of nature. The standard comes from American Fruit Growers v. 
-Brogdex, 2 83 U.S. 1 , 1 2 ( 1 931 ) , which found that an orange injected 
with borax to resist mold was not patentable. The criterion is 
whether the result of the activity is "an article for use which 
possesses a new or distinctive form, quality, or property." 
[ Chakrabarty's bacteria consume several components of petroleum that 
the ordinary bacteria do not ingest. The second obstacle would be 
the CCPA itself, which would likely not take long in finding the 
invention not to be a product of nature. 
I have no tidy bottom line on this case. If you like, I can 
try to run down the relevant legislative histories on the 1930 and 
1970 Acts, which might shed 1 ight on the statutory interpretation 
question. I could also review the pleadings below in this 
litigation, in search of enlightenment on the product of nature 
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May 8, 1980 
Re: 79-136 - Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Enclosed is a first draft in this case. My initial 
instincts were to include a footnote saying the following: 
,, 
One of the more extravagant statements 
attributed to a scientific source is that of Dr. 
Clement Market of Yale, who is depicted as 
researching the cloning of domestic livestock. 
He is quoted as saying: 
"I could wipe out all of Yale's 
deficits with the valuable bulls raised 
from the embryos I could produce [in 
the laboratory] in one weekend." 
Fortune, June 19, 1978. 
We, of course, would be happy to wipe out Yale's 
deficits and those of all the universities, great 
and small. But whether this should be done by 
genetic cloning of bulls or by the more prosaic 
method of door-to-door solicitation of alumni is~ 
not a matter on which we are ordained to decide. 
I finally decided against including this passage for fear 
the Harvard men among us would demand equal time.-forthe bull 
produced by their faculty. ~ 
t 
Re,gards., 
L cA v) 
- - Mr. Justice Brennan Kr. Justice Stewart 
✓ Mr. Justice White ' Mr. Justice Marshall Mr. Justice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Mr. Justice Rehnquist 
Mr. Justice Stevens 
From: The Chief Justioe 
MAY 8 1980 
Circulated: __ ,_, ______ _ 
1st DRAFT 
"R,.-,~~.rculated: _____ _ 
~UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES ~. (!:s~ .-
.-,; ' , No. 79-136 //,l(.A t( (,,_ 
Sidney A. Diamond, Commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Ananda M. Chakrabarty et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
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MR. CHIEF JusTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the / 
~~ 
~ ~ ~ ( Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether a live, human-
made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 
U.S. C. § lOL 
I 
In 1972, respondent Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, filed a 
patent application, assigned to the General Electric Company. 
The application asserted 36 claims related to Chakrabarty's 
invention of "a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas con-
taining therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, 
each of said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon 
degradative pathway." 1 This human-made, genetically engi-
?{~o~r~ 
,,; ~ ,~~ 
1~~ 
)lb~ Wlu' r.~ 
~-lt:u ~~ 
~~ $~ 
~rr ~ ,~~. 
1 Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate from the chromo- _ . ~ /J , 
somes of the cell. In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associate dis- ,.L ~~
covered that plasmids control the oil degradation abilities of certain bac-
teria. In particular, the two researchers discovered plasmids capable of ~ k~ ~ V' ~ 
degrading camphor and octane, two components of crude oil. In the work 
represented by the patent application at issue here, Chakrabarty discov-~ _ 
ered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of degrading four 
different oil components, could be transferred to and maintained stably in \JA-<:: 
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neered bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple com-
ponents of crude oil. Because of this property, which is pos: 
sessed by no naturaUy occurring bacteria, Ch~krabarty'~ 
invention is believed to have significant value for the treat.; 
ment of oil spills.2 
Chakrabarty's patent claims were of three types: first, 
process claims for the method of producing the bacteria; 
second, claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier material 
floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and 
third, claims to the bacteria themselves. The patent examiner 
allowed the claims falling into the first two categories, but 
rejected claims for the bacteria. His decision rested on two 
grounds: (1) that micro-organisms are "products of nature,'~ 
'and (2) that as living things they are not patentable subject 
matter under 35 U. S. C. § 101. 
Chakrabarty appealed the rejection of these claims to the 
Patent Office Board of Appeals, and the Board affirmed the 
Examiner on the second ground.3 Relying on the legislative 
history o:f the 1930 Plant Patent Act, in which Con .. 
gress extended patent protection to certain asexually repro-
duced plants, the Board concluded that § 101 was not in-
tended to cover living things such as these laboratory created 
micro-organisms. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, by a divided 
vote, reversed on the authority of its prior decision in In re 
2 Prior to the instant invention, biological control of oil spills required 
the use of a mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, each capable of 
degrading one component of the oil complex. In this way, oil is decom-
posed into simpler substances which can serve as food for aquatic life. 
However, for various reasons; only a portion of any such mixed culture 
survives to attack the oil spill. By breaking down multiple components 
of oil, Chakrabarty's micro-organism promises more efficient and rapid 
oil-tipill control. 
3 The Board concluded that the new bacteria were not "products of 
nature," because Pseuclomonas bacteria containing two or more differeni 
energy-generating plasmids are not naturally occurring. 
- -
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Bergy, 563 F. 2d 1031 (1978), which held that "the fact that 
micro-organisms ... are alive ... [is] without legal signifi-
cance" for purposes of the patent law.4 Subsequently, we 
granted the Government's petition for certiorari in Bergy, 
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case "for further 
consideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584." 
438 U. S. 902 (1978). The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals then vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty and con-
solida.ted the case with Bergy for reconsideration. After 
re-examining both cases in the light of our holding in Flook, 
that court, with one dissent, reaffirmed its earlier judgments. 
- F. 2d - (1979). 
The Government again sought certiorari, and we granted 
the writ as to both Bergy and Chakrabarty. - U. S. -
(1979). Since then, Bergy has been dismissed as moot, -
U.S. - (1980), leaving only Chakrabarty for decision. 
II 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to legislate in 
the areas of patents and copyrights to "promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts." Art. I, § 8. The patent laws 
promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights 
for a limited period as an incentive for their inventiveness 
and research efforts. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 
U. S. 470, 480-481 (1974); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 
322 U. S. 471 , 484 (1944). It is hoped that "[t]he produc-
tive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes 
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by way 
of increased employment and better lives for our citizens." 
Kewanee, supra, at 480. 
The question before us in this case is a narrow one of statu-
4 B ergy involved a patent application for a pure culture of the micro-
organism Streptomyces vellosus found to be useful in the production of 
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tory interpretation requiring us to construe 35 U. S. C. § 101, 
which provides: 
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful proc-
ess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title." 
Specifically, we must determine whether respondent's micro-
organism constitutes a "manufacture" or "composition of mat-
ter" within the meaning of the statute.5 
III 
In cases of statutory construction we begin with the lan-
guage of the statute. Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 405 (1979). And "unless otherwise 
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 
- U. S.-, - (1979) . We have also cautioned that courts 
"should not read into the patent laws limitations and con-
ditions which the legislature has not expressed." United 
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp. , 289 U. S. 178, 199 ( 1933). 
Guided by these canons of construction, this Court has read 
the term "manufacture" in § 101 in accordance with its dic-
tionary definition to mean "the production of articles for use 
from raw materials prepared by giving to these · materials 
new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations whether by 
hand labor or by machinery." American Fruit Growers, Inc. 
v. Brogdex Co., 283 U. S. 1, 11 (1931). Similarly, "composi-
tion of matter" has been construed consistent with its common 
usage to include "all compositions of two or more substances 
and . .. all composite articles, whether they be the results of" 
5 This case doe:; not involve the other "conditions and requirements" of 
the patent laws, such as novelty and nonobviousness. 35 U. S. C. §§ 102,. 
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chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be 
gases, fluids, powders, or solids." Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 
149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (DC 1957) (citing 1 A. Deller, Walker 
on Patents§ 14, p. 55 (1st ed. 1937) ). In choosing such expan-
sive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of matter," 
modified by the comprehensive "any," Congress plainly con-
templated that the patent laws would be given wide scope. 
The relevant legislative history also supports a broad con-
struction. The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas 
Jefferson, defined statutory subject matter as "any new and 
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new or useful improvement [thereof]." Act of Feb. 21, 
1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. The Act embodied Jefferson's 
philosophy that "ingenuity should receive a liberal encourage-
ment." V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 75-76. See 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1966). Sub-
sequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed this 
same broad language. In 1952, when the patent laws were 
recodified, Congress replaced the word "art" with "process," 
but otherwise left Jefferson's phraseology intact. The Com-
mjttee Reports accompanying the 1952 act inform us that 
dbngress intended statutory subject matter to "include any-
thing under the sun that is made by man." S. Rep. No. 1979, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 
2d Sess., 6 (1952).6 
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or that it 
embraces every discovery. It is, of course, well-settled that 
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gotts-
chalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 67 (1973); Funk Seed Co. v. 
6 This same language was employed by P. J. Federico, a principal drafts-
man of the 1952 recodification, in his testimony regarding that legislation : 
"[U] nder section 101 a person may have invented a machine or manufac-
ture,· which may include anything under the sun that is made by man . . .. " 
Hearings on H . R. 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Com-
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Kalo Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 , 
How. 61, 112-121 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 155, 
175 (1852). Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth 
or a new plant found in the wild are not patentable subject . 
matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated 
law that E=Mc2 ; nor could Newton have patented the law 
of gravity. Such "discoveries" are "manifestations of ... 
nature, free to a.ll men and reserved exclusively to none." 
Funk, supra, at 130. 
Judged in this light, respondent's micro-organism plainly 
qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a 
hitherto unknown natural phenomena, but to a nonnaturally 
occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of 
human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, character [and] 
use." Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 615 (1887). 
The point is underscored dramatically by comparison of the 
invention here with that in Funk. There, the patentee had 
discovered that there existed in nature certain species of root-
nodule bacteria which did not exert a mutually inhibitive 
effect on each other. He used that discovery to produce a 
mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous 
plants. Concluding that the patentee had discovered "only 
some of the handiwork of nature," the Court ruled the prod-
uct nonpatentable: 
"Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in 
the package infects the same group of leguminous plants 
which it always infected. No species acquires a different 
use. The combina.tion of the six species produces no new 
bacteria, no change in the six bacteria, and no enlarge-
ment of the range of their utility. Each species has the 
same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in theit · 
'natural way. Their use in combination does not improve 
in any way their natural functioning. They serve the 
same ends nature originally provided and act quite inde-
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-:Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacteria 
with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and having the potential for significant utility. His 
discovery is not Nature's handiwork, but his own; as such it 
is patentable subject matter under § 101. 
IV 
Two contrary arguments are advanced, neither of which we 
find persuasive. 
(A) 
The Government's first argument rests on the enactment 
of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which afforded patent protec-
tion to certain asexually reproduced plants, and the 1970 Plant 
Variety Protection Act, which authorized patents for certain 
sexually reproduced plants but excluded bacteria from its 
protection.7 In the Government's view, the passage of these 
Acts evidences congressional understanding that the terms 
"manufacture" or "composition of matter" do not include 
living things; if they did, the Government argues, neither Act 
would have been necessary. 
We reject this argument. Prior to 1930, two factors were 
thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first 
was the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were 
products of nature for purposes of the patent law. This posi-
7 The Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U. S. C. § 161, provides in relevant 
part: 
"Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and 
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and 
newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propogated plant or a plant 
found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor .... " 
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, provides in relevant part: 
"The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than 
fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the 
variety, or his successor in interest, shall be entitled to plant variety 
protection therefor .... " 7 U.S. C. §2402 (a.) . 
See generally, 3 A. Deller, Walker on Patents, Chapter IX (2d ed. 1964); 
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tion appears to have derived from the decision of the Patent 
Office in Ex parte Latimer, 1889 C. D. 123, in which a patent _ 
elaim for fiber found in the needle of the Pinus australis was 
rejected. The Commissioner reasoned that a contrary result 
would permit "patents [to] be obtained upon the trees of the 
forests and the plants of the earth, which of course would be 
unreasonable and impossible." ·· Id., . at 126. The Latimer 
case, it seems, came to "set[] forth the general stand taken 
iu these matters'; that plants were natural products not sub-
ject to patent protection. H. Thorne, Relation of Patent 
Law to Natural Products, 6 J · Pat. Off. Soc. 23, 24 (1923).8 
The second obstacle to patent protection for plants was the 
fact that plants were thought not ainenable to the "written 
description" requirement of the patent law. See 35 U. S. C. 
§ 112. Because new piants may differ from old only in color 
or perfume, differentiation by written description was often 
impossible. See Hearings on H. R. 11372 before the House 
Committee on Patents, 71 Cong., 2d Sess., 4 ( 1930), p. 7 
(memorandum of Patent Comihissioner Robertson) . 
In enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both 
of these concerns. It explained at length its belief that the 
work of the pia.nt breeder "in aid of nature" was patentable 
invention. S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., ~8 (1930); 
H . R. Rep. No. 1129, 71st Cong. , 2d Sess., ~8 (1930). And it 
relaxed the written description requirement in favor of "a 
description .. . as complete as is reasonably possible." 35 
U. S. C. § 162. No Committee or Member of Congress, how-
ever, expressed the broader view, now urged by the Govern-
ment, that the terms "manufacture" or "composition of mat- -
8 Writing three years after the passage of the 1930 Act, R . Cook, Editor 
of the Journal of Heredity, commented: "It is a little hard for plant men 
to under:s tand why [Art icle I § s·1 of the Constitution should not have 
been earlier const rued to include the promotion of the art of plant breed-
ing. The reason for this i::; probably to be found in the principle that 
natural products are not patentable." ·-Flori::;ts Exchange and Horticultural" 
Trade World, July 15, 1933, at 9. ' 
-
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ter" exclude living things. The sole support for that position 
in the legislative history of the 1930 Act is found in the 
conclusory statement of Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, in 
a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate committees 
considering the 1930 Act, that "the patent laws ... at the 
present time are understood to cover only inventions or dis-
coveries in the field of inanimate nature." See S. Rep. No. 
315, supra, at Appendix A; H. R. Rep. No. 1129, supra, at 
Appendix A. Secretary Hyde's opinion, however, is not 
entitled to controlling weight. His views were solicited on the 
administration of the new law and not on the scope of patent-
able subject matter-an area beyond his competence. More-
over, there is language in the House and Senate Committee 
reports suggesting that to the extent Congress considered the 
matter it found the Secretary's dichotomy unpersuasive. The 
reports observe : 
"There is a clear and logical distinction between the 
discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inani-
rnate things, such, for example, as a new and useful 
natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature 
unassisted by man. . . . On the other hand, a plant dis-
covery resulting from cultivation is unique, isolated, and 
is not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by 
nature unaided by man .. . . " S. Rep. No. 315, supra, at 
6 ; H. R. Rep. No. 1129, supra, at 6 (emphasis added). 
Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was 
not between living and inanimate things, but between prod-
ucts of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inven-
tions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of 
human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the 
Plant Patent Act affords the Government no support. 
Nor does the passage of the 1970 Plant Variety Protection 
Act support the Government's position. As the Government 
acknowledges, sexually reproduced plants were not included. 
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duced true-to-type through seedlings. Brief for United States 
27, n. 31. By 1970, however, it was generally recognized that 
true-to-type reproduction was possible and that plant patent 
protection was therefore appropriate. The 1970 Act extended 
that protection. There is nothing in its language or history to 
suggest that it was enacted because § 101 did not include 
living things. 
In particular, we find no support for the Government's posi-
tion in the exclusion of bacteria from plant variety protection. 
See supra, at n. 7. The legislative history does not explain 
the reason for this exclusion. As the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals suggested, it may simply reflect congressional 
agreement with the result reached by that court in deciding 
In re Arzberger, 112 F . 2d 834 (1940), which held that bacteria 
were not plants for the purposes of the 1930 Act. Or it may 
reflect the fact that prior to 1970 the Pa.tent Office had issued 
patents for bacteria under § 101.0 In any event, absent some 
clear indication that Congress "focused on [the] issues . . . 
directly related to the one presently before the Court," SEC v. 
Sloan, 436 U.S. 103, 120-121 (1978) , we are unwilling to read 
i11to its actions an intent to modify the plain meaning of the 
words found in § 101. See TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 189-
193 (1978) ; United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). 
(B) 
The Government's second argument is that micro-organisms 
cannot qualify as patentable subject matter until Congress 
expressly authorizes such protection. Its position rests on the 
fact that genetic technology was unforeseen when Congress· 
• In 1873, the Patent Office granted Louis Pasteur a patent on "yeast, 
free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture." And 
in 1967 and 1968, immediately prior to the passage of the Plant Variety 
Protection Act, that office granted two patents which, as the Government 
concedes, state claims for living micro-organisms. See Reply Brief of" 
t!Jnited States, at 3, and n. 2. 
-
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tinacted § 101. From this it is argued that resolution of th~ 
patentability of inventions such as respondent's should be 
left to Congress. The legislative process, the Government 
argues, is best equipped to weigh the competing economic, 
social, and scientific considerations involved, and to deter-
mine whether living organisms produced by genetic engineer-
ing should receive patent protection. In support of this posi-
tion, the Government relies on our recent holding in Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and the statement that the judi-
ciary "must proceed cautiously when . .. asked to extend 
patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." Id., 
at 596. 
It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must 
define and delimit patentability concepts; but it is equally 
true that once Congress has spoken it is " the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Congress 
has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable 
subject matter in § 101 ; we perform ours in construing the 
language Congress has employed. In so doing, our obliga-
tion is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity 
appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose. 
Here, we perceive no ambiguity. The subject matter provi-
sions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill 
the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting scientific 
discovery. Broad general language is not necessarily ambig-
uous when congressional objectives require broad terms. 
ifothing in Flook is to the contrary. That case applied our 
prior precedents to determine that a "claim for an improved 
method of calculation, even when tied to a specific end use, 
is unpatentable subject matter under § 101." 437 U. S., at 
595, n. 18. It carefully scrutinized the claim at issue to deter-
mine whether it was precluded from patent protection under 
"the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for 
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that here. Flook did not announce a new principle that 
inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when the' 
patent lav.-s were enacted are unpatentable per se. 
To read that concept into Flook would frustrate the pur-
poses of the patent law. This Court frequently has observed. 
that a statute cannot be confined to the "particular applica-
tion [s] . .. contemplated by the legislators." Barr v. United 
States, 324 U. S. 83, 90 (1945). Accord, Browder v. United 
States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 
302 U. S. 253, 257 ( 1937). 'fhis is especially true in the field 
of patent law. A rule that unanticipated inventions are 
without protection would conflict with the core concept of 
the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability. 
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S., at 12-17. As Mr. 
Justice Douglas has reminded, the inventions most benefiting 
mankind are those that "push back the frontiers of chemistry, 
physics, and the like." A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Corp., 340 U. S. 147, 154 (1950) (concurring opinion). It is 
precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable that 
Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101.10 
To buttress its argument, the Government, with the support 
of arnicus, points to the risks that may be generated by re.; 
search endeavors such as respondent's. The briefs present a 
gruesome parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel 
laureates, are quoted suggesting that genetic research may 
pose a serious threat. to the h11man race, or, at the very least, 
that the dangers are far too substantial to permit such research 
to proceed apace at this time. We are told that genetic re-
search may spread pollution and disease; that it may result in 
1 0 Even an abbreviated list of patented inventions underscores the point : 
telegraph (Morse, No. 1647); telephone (Bell , No. 174,465) ; electric lamp 
(Edison, No. 223,898) ; airplance (the Wrights, No. 821,393); transistor 
(Bardeen & Brattain, No . 2,524,035) ; neutronic reactor (Fermi & Szilard, 
No. 2,708,656) ; laser (Schawlow & Townes, No . 2,929,922). See generally 
;Revolutionary Ideas, Patents & Progress in America, Office of Patents . 
(1976) . . 
-
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~ loss of genetic diversity; and that its practice may tend to 
depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are 
forcefully, even passionately presented; they remind us that> 
at times, human ingenuity cannot control fully the forces it 
creates-that, with Hamlet, it is better sometimes "to bear 
those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." 
It is argued that this Court should weigh these potential 
hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is 
patentable subject matter under § 101. We disagree. The 
grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to 
put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The 
large amount of research that has already occurred when no 
researcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would 
be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to 
patentability will not deter the scientific mind from searching 
into the unknown any more than Canute could command the 
tides. Whether respondent's claims are patentable may deter-
lnine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of 
rewa.rd or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all. 
What is more important is that we are without competence 
to entertain these arguments-either to brush them aside as 
fantasies generated by fear of the unknown, or to act on them. 
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for 
resolution by the legislative process after the kind of investi-
gation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can pro-
vide and we cannot. That process involves the balancing of 
competing values and interests, which in our democratic sys-
tem is the business of elected representatives. The conten-
tions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political 
branches of the government, the Congress and the Executive, 
and not to. the courts.11 
11 Those branches have already taken action in the area of genetic 
technology. In 1976 the National Institutes of Health released guidelines 
for NIH-sponsored genetic research which established conditions under 
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• 
We have emphasized in the recent past that "[o]ur individ-
ual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular [leg-
islative] course ... is to be put aside in the process of inter-
preting a statute." TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978). 
Our task, rather, is the narrow one of determining what Con-
gress meant by the words it used in the statute; once that is 
done our powers are exhausted. Congress is free to amend 
§ 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms pro-
duced by genetic engineering. Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2181 
( exempting from patent protection inventions "useful solely 
in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy 
in an atomic weapon"). Or it may choose to era.ft a statute 
specifically designed for such living things. But, until Con-
gress takes such action. this Court must construe the language 
of § 101 as it is. The language of that section fairly embraces 
respondent's invention. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals is affirmed. 
those guidelines were revised and relaxed. 43 Fed. Reg. 60080, 60108, 
60134. Moreover, several committees of the Congress have held extensive 
hearings on these issues. See, e. g ., Hearings on genetic engineering-
before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess . (1975) ; Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation , 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) ; 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977) . Hence, to say that arguments concerning the potential 
haza rds of genetic experimentation should be addressed elsewhere is not to 
suggPst that. the Congress or the Executive have not fulfilled its responsi-
bilities in this area. 
' ' - e Mr . Justice Brennan Mr . Juetice Stewart Mr. Justice White ·· 
Mr . Justice Marshall 
Mr . Jus-t:ice Blackmun 
Mr. Justice Powell 
~ w j 13 s Mr. Just ice Rehnquist Mr. Justice Stevens 
~ ~ From: The Chief Justioe ,:ee ~ ,~ 1\-t __ .._ .. ,-~AA~ MAY 
~a,e:JJ!'Cu.lated: 
~UPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATffl 
No. 79-136 
Sidney A. Diamond, Commissioner 
of Patents and Trademarks, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
Ananda M. Chakrabarty et al. 
On Writ of Certiorari to 
the United States Court 
of Customs and Patent 
Appeals. 
[May -, 1980] 
MR. CHIEF JusTICE BURGER delivered the opinion of the 
Court. 
We granted certiorari to determine whether a live, human-
made micro-organism is patentable subject matter under 35 
U. S. C. § 101. 
I 
In 1972, respondent Chakrabarty, a microbiologist, filed a 
patent application, assigned to the General Electric Company. 
The application asserted 36 claims related to Chakrabarty's 
invention of "a bacterium from the genus Pseudomonas con-
taining therein at least two stable energy-generating plasmids, 
each of said plasmids providing a separate hydrocarbon 
degradative pathway." 1 This human-made, genetically engi-
1 Plasmids are hereditary units physically separate from the chromo-
somes of the cell . In prior research, Chakrabarty and an associat e dis-
covered that plasmids cont rol the oil degradation abilities of certain bac-
teria. In particular, the two researchers discovered plasmids capable of 
degrading camphor and octane, two components of crude oil. In the work 
represented by the patent application at issue here, Chakrabarty discov-
ered a process by which four different plasmids, capable of degrading four 
different oil components, could be t ransferred to and maintained stably in 









DIAMOND v. CHAKRABAETY 
neered bacterium is capable of breaking down multiple com-
ponents of crude oil. Because of this property, whtch is pos: 
sessed by no naturaUy occurring bacteria, Ch~krabarty's 
invention is believed to have significant value for the treat.; 
ment of oil spills.2 
Chakrabarty's patent claims were of three types: first, 
process claims for the method of producing the bacteria; 
second, claims for an inoculum comprised of a carrier material 
floating on water, such as straw, and the new bacteria; and 
third, claims to the bacteria themselves. The patent examiner 
allowed the claims falling into the first two categories, but 
rejected claims for the bacteria. His decision rested on two 
grounds: tf) that micro-orga1;isms are "products of nature,'~ 
'and (2) that as living things they are not patentable subject 
matter under 35 U. S. C. § 101. 
Chakrabarty appealed the rejection of these claims to the 
Patent Office Board of Appeals, and the "l3oard a_ffirmed the 
Examiner on the second ground.3 Relying on the legislative 
history of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, in which Con .. 
gress extended patent protection to certain asexually repro-
duced plants, the B.9ard conclud~~§...!QL.w~n,1>t in-_. 
te~d t~~ thi~g_s such as these laboratory created 
micro-orgamsms. 
The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, by a divided 
vote, reversed on the authority of its prior decision in In re 
2 Prior to the instant invention, biological control of oil spills required 
the use of a mixture of naturally occurring bacteria, each capable of 
degrading one component of the oil complex. In this way, oil is decom-
posed into simpler substances which can serve as food for aquatic life. 
However, for various reasons; only a portion of any such mixed culture 
survives to attack the oil spill. By breaking down multiple components 
of oil, Chakrabarty's micro-organism promises more efficient and rapid 
oil-~pill control. 
3 The Board concluded that the new bacteria were not "products of 
lilature," because Pseudomonas bacteria containing two or more different 
energy-generating plasmids are not naturally occurring. 
- -
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Bergy, 563 F. 2d 1031 (1978) , which held that "the fact that 
micro-organisms . .. are alive ... [is] without legal signifi-
cance" for purposes of the patent law.4 Subsequently, we 
granted the Government's petition for certiorari in Bergy, 
vacated the judgment, and remanded the case "for further 
consideration in light of Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584." 
438 U. S. 902 (1978). The Court of Customs and Patent 
Appeals then vacated its judgment in Chakrabarty and con-
solidated the case with Bergy for reconsideration. After 
re-examining both cases in the iight of our holding in Flook, 
that court, with one dissent, rea.ffirmed its earlier judgments. 
- F. 2d - (1979). 
The Government again sought certiorari, and we granted 
the writ as to both Bergy and Chakrabarty. - U. S. -
(1979). Since then, Bergy has been dismissed as moot, -
U.S. - (1980), leaving only Chakrabarty for decision. 
II 
The Constitution grants Congress the power to legislate in 
the areas of patents and copyrights to "promote the Progress 
of Science and the useful Arts." Art. I , § 8. The patent laws 
promote this progress by offering inventors exclusive rights 
for a limited period as an incentive for their inventiveness 
and research efforts. Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 
U. S. 470, 480-481 (1974); Universal Oil Co. v. Globe Co., 
322 U. S. 471, 484 (1944). It is hoped that "[t]he produc-
tive effort thereby fostered will have a positive effect on 
society through the introduction of new products and processes 
of manufacture into the economy, and the emanations by wa.y 
of increased employment and better lives for our citizens." 
Kewanee, supra, at 480. 
The question before us in this case is a narrow one of statu-
4 B ergy involved a patent application for a pure culture of the micro-
organism Streptomyces vellosus found to be useful in the production of 
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tory interpretation requiring us to construe 35 U. S. C. § 101, 
which provides: 
"Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful proc-
ess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or 
any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a 
patent therefor, subject to the conditions and require-
ments of this title." 
Specifically, we must determine whether respondent's micro-
organism constitutes a "manufacture" or "co131position of IDIJ{·-
ter" within the meaning of the statute.5 __, 
III 
In cases of statutory construction we begin with the lan-
guage of the statute. Southeastern Community College v. 
Davis, 442 U. S. 397, 405 (1979). And "unless otherwise 
defined, words will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, 
contemporary, common meaning." Perrin v. United States, 
- U. S.-, - (1979). We have also cautioned that courts 
"should not read into the patent laws limitations and con-
ditions which the legislature has not expressed." United 
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 199 (1933). 
Guided by these canons of construction, this Court has read 
the term "manufaature" in § 101 in accordance with its dic-
tionary definition to mean "the production of articles for use 
from raw materials prepa.red by giving to these materials 
new forms, qualities, properties, or combinations whether by 
hand labor or by machinery." American Fruit Growers, Inc. 
v. Brogdex Co. , 283 U. S. 1, 11 (1931) . Similarly, "composi-
tion of matter" has been construed consistent with its common 
usage to include "all compositions of two or more substances 
and . .. all composite articles, whether they be the results of" 
6 This case doe:; not involve the other "conditions and requirements" of 
the patent laws, such as novelty and nonobviousness. 35 U. S. C. §§ 102,. 
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chemical union, or of mechanical mixture, or whether they be 
gases, fluids, powders, or solids." Shell Dev. Co. v. Watson, 
149 F. Supp. 279, 280 (DC 1957) (citing I A. Deller, Walker I 
on Patents§ 14, p. 55 (1st ed. 1937) ). In choosing such expan-
sive terms as "manufacture" and "composition of matter," 
modified by the comprehensive "any," Congress plainly con-
templated that the patent laws would be given wide scope. 
The relevant legislative history also supports a broad con-
struction. The Patent Act of 1793, authored by Thomas 
Jefferson, defined statutory subject matter as "any new and 
useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, 
or any new or useful improvement [thereof]." Act of Feb. 21, 
1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318. The Act embodied Jefferson's 
philosophy that "ingenuity should receive a liberal encourage-
ment." V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 75-76. See 
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 7-10 (1966). Sub-
sequent patent statutes in 1836, 1870, and 1874 employed this 
same broad language. In 1952, when the patent laws were 
recodified, Congress replaced the word "art" with "process," 
but otherwise left Jefferson's phraseology intact. The Com-
mjttee Reports accompanying the 1952 act inform us that 
Congress intended statutory subject matter to "include any-
thing under the sun that is made by man." S. Rep. No. 1979, 
82d Cong., 2d Sess., 5 (1952); H. R. Rep. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 
2d Sess., 6 (1952).6 
This is not to suggest that § 101 has no limits or tha,t it 
embraces every discovery. It is, of course, well-settled that 
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are not 
patentable. See Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978); Gotts-
chalk v. Benson, 409 U. S. 63, 67 (1973); Funk Seed Co. v. 
6 This same language was employed by P. J. Federico, a principal drafts-
man of the 1952 recodification, in his testimony regarding that legislation: 
" [U]uder section 101 a person may have invented a machine or manufac-
ture, which may include anything under the sun that is made by man . . .. " 
Hearings on H. R . 3760 before Subcommittee No. 3 of the House Com-
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Kalo Co., 333 U. S. 127, 130 (1948); O'Reilly v. Morse, 15 , 
How. 61, 112-121 (1853); Le Roy v. Tatham, 14 How. 155, 
175 (1852) . Thus, a new mineral discovered in the earth 
or a new plant found in the wild are not patentable subject . 
matter. Likewise, Einstein could not patent his celebrated 
law that E=Mc2 ; nor could Newton have patented the law 
of gravity. Such "discoveries" are "manifestations of ... 
nature, free to aU men and reserved exclusively to none." 
Funk, supra, at 130. 
Judged in this light, respondent's micro-organism plainly 
qualifies as patentable subject matter. His claim is not to a 
hitherto unknown natural phenomena, but to a nonnaturally 
occurring manufacture or composition of matter-a product of 
human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, character [and] 
use." Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 615 (1887). 
The point is underscored dramatically by comparison of the 
invention here with that in Funk. There, the patentee had 
discovered that there existed in nature certain species of root-
nodule bacteria which did not exert a mutually inhibitive 
effect on each other. He used that discovery to produce a 
mixed culture capable of inoculating the seeds of leguminous 
plants. Concluding that the patentee had discovered "only 
some of the handiwork of nature," the Court ruled the prod-
uct nonpatentable: 
"Each of the species of root-nodule bacteria contained in 
the package infects the same group of leguminous plants 
which it always infected. No species acquires a different 
use. The combination of the six species produces no new 
bacteria, no change in the six bacteria, and no enlarge-
ment of the range of their utility. Each species has the 
same effect it always had. The bacteria perform in their · 
natural way. Their use in combination does not improve 
in any way their natural functioning. They serve the 
same ends nature originally provided and act quite inde-
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;Here, by contrast, the patentee has produced a new bacteria 
with markedly different characteristics from any found in 
nature and having the potential for significant utility. His 
discovery is not Nature's handiwork, but his own; as such it 
is patentable subject matter under § 101. 
IV 
Two contrary arguments are advanced, neither of which we 
find persuasive. 
(A) 
The Government's first argument rests on the enactment 
of the 1930 Plant Patent Act, which afforded patent protec-
tion to certain asexually reproduced plants, and the 1970 Plant 
Variety Protection Act, which authorized patents for certain 
sexually reproduced plants but excluded bacteria from its 
protection.7 In the Government's view, the passage of these 
Acts evidences congressional understanding that the terms 
"manufacture" or "composition of matter" do not include 
living things; if they did, the Government argues, neither Act 
would have been necessary. 
We reject this argument. Prior to 1930, two factors were 
thought to remove plants from patent protection. The first 
was the belief that plants, even those artificially bred, were 
products of nature for purposes of the patent law. This posi-
7 The Plant Patent Act of 1930, 35 U. S. C. § 161, provides in relevant 
part: 
" Whoever invents or discovers and asexually reproduces any distinct and 
new variety of plant, including cultivated sports, mutants, hybrids, and 
newly found seedlings, other than a tuber propagated plant or a plant 
found in an uncultivated state, may obtain a patent therefor . . . . " 
The Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970, provides in relevant part: 
"The breeder of any novel variety of sexually reproduced plant (other than 
fungi, bacteria, or first generation hybrids) who has so reproduced the 
variety, or his successor in interest, shall be entitled to plant variety 
protection therefor . . .. " 7 U. S. C. § 2402 (a) . 
See generally, 3 A. Deller, Walker on Patents, Chapter IX (2d ed. 1964); 
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tion appears to have derived from the decision of the Patent 
Office in Ex parte Latimer, 1889 C. D. 123, in which a patent 
elaim for fiber found in the needle of the Pinus australis was 
rejected. The Commissioner reasoned that a contrary result 
would permit "patents [to] be obtained upon the trees of the 
forests and the plants of the earth, which of course would be 
unreasonable and impossible." ·· Id., . at 126. The Latimer 
case, it seems, came to "set[] forth the general stand taken 
in these matters" that plants were natural products not sub-
ject to patent protection. H. Thorne, Relation of Patent 
Law to Natural Products, 6 j_ Pat. Off. Soc. 23, 24 (1923).8 
The second obstacle to patent protection for plants was the 
fact that plants were thought not amenable to the "written 
description" requirement of the patent law. See 35 U. S. C. 
§ 112. Because new piants inay differ from old only in color . 
or perfume, differentiation by written description was often 
impossible. See Hearings on H. R. 11372 before the House 
Committee on Patents, 71 Cong., 2d Sess., 4 ( 1930), p. 7 
(memorandum of Patent Coinihissioner Robertson). 
In enacting the Plant Patent Act, Congress addressed both 
of these concerns. It explained at length its belief that the 
work of the piant breeder "in aid of nature" was patentable 
invention. S. Rep. No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 6-8 (1930); 
H. R. Rep. No. 1129, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 6-8 (1930). And it 
relaxed the written description requirement in favor of "a 
description ... as complete as is reasonably possible." 35 
U.S. C. § 162. No Committee or Member of Congress, how-
ever, expressed the broader view, now urged by the Govern-
ment, that the terms "manufacture" or "composition of mat-
8 Writing three years after the passage of the 1930 Act, R. Cook, Editor 
of the Journal of Heredity , commented: "It is a little hard for plant men 
to under::;tand why [Article I § 8] of the Constitution should not have 
been ea rlier construed to include the promotion of the art of plant breed-
ing. The reason for this is probably to be found in the principle that 
natural products are not patentable ." 'Florists Exchange and Horticultural 
Trade World, July 15, 1933, at 9. ' 
- -
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ter" exclude living things. The sole support for that position 
in the legislative history of the 1930 Act is found in the 
conclusory statement of Secretary of Agriculture Hyde, in 
a letter to the Chairmen of the House and Senate committees 
considering the 1930 Act, that "the patent laws .. . at the 
present time are understood to cover only inventions or dis-
coveries in the field of inanimate nature." See S. Rep. No. 
315, supra, at Appendix A; H. R. Rep. No. 1129, supra, at 
Appendix A. Secretary Hyde's opinion, however, is not 
entitled to controlling weight. His views were solicited on the 
administration of the new law and not on the scope of patent-
able subject matter-an area beyond his competence. More-
over, there is language in the House and Senate Committee 
reports suggesting that to the extent Congress considered the 
matter it found the Secretary's dichotomy unpersuasive. The 
reports observe : 
"There is a clear and logical distinction between the 
discovery of a new variety of plant and of certain inani-
mate things, such, for example, as a new and useful 
natural mineral. The mineral is created wholly by nature 
unassisted by man. . . . On the other hand, a plant dis-
covery resulting from cultivation is unique , isolated, and 
is not repeated by nature, nor can it be reproduced by 
nature una.ided by man .. . . " S. Rep. No. 315, supra, at 
6 ; H. R. Rep. No. 1129, supra, at 6 (emphasis added) . 
Congress thus recognized that the relevant distinction was 
not between living and inanimate things. but between prod-
ucts of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inven-
tions. Here, respondent's micro-organism is the result of 
human ingenuity and research. Hence, the passage of the 
Plant Patent Act affords the Government no support. 
Nor does the passage of the 1970 Plant Variety Protection 
Act support the Government's position. As the Government 
acknowledges, sexually reproduced plants were not included. 
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duced true-to-type through seedlings. Brief for United States 
27, n. 31. By 1970, however, it was generally recognized that 
true-to-type reproduction was possible and that plant patent 
protection was therefore appropriate. The 1970 Act extended 
that protection. There is nothing in its language or history to 
suggest that it was enacted because § 101 did not include 
living things. 
In particular, we find no support for the Government's posi-
tion in the exclusion of bacteria from plant variety protection. 
See supra, at n. 7. The legislative history does not explain 
the reason for this exclusion. As the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals suggested, it may simply reflect congressional 
agreement with the result reached by that court in deciding 
In re Arzberger, 112 F. 2d 834 (1940), which held that bacteria 
were not plants for the purposes of the 1930 Act. Or it may 
reflect the fact that prior to 1970 the Patent Office had issued 
patents for bacteria under § 101.0 In any event, absent some 
clear indication that Congress "focused on [the] issues ... 
directly related to the one presently before the Court," SEC v. 
Sloan, 436 U. S. 103, 120-121 (1978), we are unwilling to read 
into its actions an intent to modify the plain meaning of the 
words found in § 101. See TV A v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 189-
193 (1978); United States v. Price, 361 U.S. 304, 313 (1960). 
(B) 
The Government's second argument is that micro-organisms 
cannot qualify as patentable subject matter until Congress 
expressly authorizes such protection. Its position rests on the 
fact that genetic technology was unforeseen when Congress· 
• In 1873, the Patent Office granted Louis Pasteur a patent on "yeast, 
free from organic germs of disease, as an article of manufacture." And 
in 1967 and 1968, immediately prior to the passage of the Plant Variety 
Protection Act, that office granted two patents which, as the Government. 
concedes, state claims for living micro-organisms. See Reply Brief of" 
liJnited States, at 3, and n. 2. 
- -
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~nacted § 101. From this it is argued that resolution of the 
patentability of inventions such as respondent's should be 
left to Congress. The legislative process, the Government 
argues, is best equipped to weigh the competing economic, 
social, and scientific considerations involved, and to deter-
mine whether living organisms produced by genetic engineer-
ing should receive patent protection. In support of this posi-
tion, the Government relies on our recent holding in Parker v. 
Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978), and the statement that the judi-
ciary "must proceed cautiously when . . . asked to extend 
patent rights into areas wholly unforeseen by Congress." Id., 
at 596. 
It is, of course, correct that Congress, not the courts, must 
define and delimit patentability concepts; but it is equally 
true that once Congress has spoken it is "the province and 
duty of the judicial department to say what the law is." 
Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). Congress 
has performed its constitutional role in defining patentable 
subject matter in § 101 ; we perform ours in construing the 
language Congress has employed. In so doing, our obliga-
tion is to take statutes as we find them, guided, if ambiguity 
appears, by the legislative history and statutory purpose. 
Here, we perceive no ambiguity. The subject matter provi-
sions of the patent law have been cast in broad terms to fulfill 
the constitutional and statutory goal of promoting scientific 
discovery. Broad general language is not necessarily ambig-
uous when congressional objectives require broad terms. 
Nothing in Flook is to the contrary. That case applied our 
prior precedents to determine that a "claim for an improved 
method of calculation. even when tied to a specific end use, 
is unpatentable subject matter under § 101." 437 U. S., at 
595, n. 18. It carefully scrutinized the claim at issue to deter-
mine whether it was precluded from patent protection under 
" the principles underlying the prohibition against patents for 
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that here. Flook did not announce a new principle that 
inventions in areas not contemplated by Congress when the· 
patent laws were enacted are unpatentable per se. 
To read that concept into Flook would frustrate the pur-
poses of the patent law. This Court frequently has observed. 
that a statute cannot be confined to the "particular applica-
tion [s] ... contemplated by the legislators." Barr v. United 
States, 324 U. S. 83, 90 (1945). Accord, Browder v. United 
States, 312 U. S. 335, 339 (1941); Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 
302 U. S. 253, 257 ( 1937). 'l'his is especially true in the field 
of patent law. A rule that unanticipated inventions are 
without protection would conflict with the core concept of 
the patent law that anticipation undermines patentability. 
See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S., at 12-17. As Mr. 
Justice Douglas has reminded, the ii1Ventions most benefiting 
mankind are those that "push back the frontiers of chemistry, 
physics, and the like." A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket 
Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (concurring opinion). It is 
precisely because such inventions are often unforeseeable that 
Congress employed broad general language in drafting § 101.10 
To buttress its argument, the Government, with the support 
of amicus, points to the risks that may be generated by re.:., 
search endeavors such as i:espondent's. The briefs present a 
gruesome parade of horribles. Scientists, among them Nobel 
laureates, are quoted suggesting that genetic research may 
pose a serious threat. to the human race, or, at the very least, 
that the dangers are far too substantial to permit such research 
to proceed apace at this time. We are told that genetic re-
search may spread pollution and disease; that it may result in 
10 Even an abbreviated list of patented invention~ underscores the point : 
telegraph (Morse, No. 1647); telephone (Bell, No. 174,465) ; electric lamp 
(Edison, No. 223,898) ; airplance (the Wrights, No. 821,393); transistor 
(Bardeen & Brattain, No. 2,524,035) ; neutronic reactor (Fermi & Szilard, 
No. 2,708,656); laser (Schawlow & Townes, No. 2,929,922). See generally 
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a loss of genetic diversity; and that its practice may tend to 
depreciate the value of human life. These arguments are 
forcefully, even passionately presented; they remind us that, 
at times, human ingenuity cannot control fully the forces it 
creates-that, with Hamlet, it is better sometimes "to bear 
those ills we have than fly to others that we know not of." 
It is argued that this Court should weigh these potential 
hazards in considering whether respondent's invention is 
patentable subject matter under § 101. We disagree. The 
grant or denial of patents on micro-organisms is not likely to 
put an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks. The 
large amount of research that has already occurred when no 
resea.rcher had sure knowledge that patent protection would 
be available suggests that legislative or judicial fiat as to 
patentability will not deter the scientific mind from searching 
into the unknown any more than Canute could command the 
tides. Whether resporident's claims are patentable may deter-
lnine whether research efforts are accelerated by the hope of 
rewa.rd or slowed by want of incentives, but that is all. 
What is more important is tha.t we are without competence 
to entertain these arguments-either to brush them aside as I 
fantasies generated by fea.r of the unknown, or to act on them. 
The choice we are urged to make is a matter of high policy for 
resolution by the legislative process after the kind of investi-
gation, examination, and study that legislative bodies can pro-
vide and we cannot. That process involves the balancing of 
competing values and interests, which in our democratic sys-
tem is the business of elected representatives. The conten- I ( 
tions now pressed on us should be addressed to the political 
branches of the government, the Congress and the Executive, • 
and not to the courts.11 
11 Tho&i branches have already taken action in the area of genetic 
technology. In 1976 the National Inst itutes of Health released guidelines 
for NIH-sponsored genetic resea rch which established conditions under 
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We have emphasized in the recent past that "[o]ur individ-
ual appraisal of the wisdom or unwisdom of a particular [leg-
islative] course ... is to be put aside in the process of inter-
preting a statute." TVA v. Hill, 437 U. S. 153, 194 (1978). 
Our task, rather, is the ruu:rmy one of determining what Con-
gress meant by the words it us;a in the statute; once that is 
done our powers are exhausted. Congress is free to amend 
§ 101 so as to exclude from patent protection organisms pro-
duced by genetic engineering. Compare 42 U. S. C. § 2181 
( exempting from patent protection inventions "useful solely 
in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy 7 
in an atomic weapon"). Or it may choose to craft a statute -specifically designed for such living things. But, until Con-
gress takes such action , this Court must construe the language 
of § 101 as it is. The language of that section fairly embraces 
respondent's invention. 
Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals is affirmed. 
those guidelines were revised and relaxed. 43 Fed. Reg. 60080, 60108, 
60134. Moreover, several committees of the Congress have held extensive 
hearings on these issues. See, e. g ., Hearings on genetic engineering-
before the Subcommittee on Health of the Senate Committee on Labor and 
Public Welfare, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975) ; Hearings before the Sub-
committee on Science, Technology, and Space of the Senate Committee on 
Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978) ; 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Health and the Environment of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1977) . Hence, to say tha t arguments concerning the potential 
hazards of genetic experimentation should be addressed elsewher•e is not to 
suggest that the Congress or the Executive have not fulfilled its responsi-
bilities in this area. 
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MR. JUSTICE BRENNAN, dissenting. 
I agree with the Court that the question before us is a nar-
row one. Neither the future of scientific research , nor even 
the ability of respondent Chakrabarty to reap some monopoly 
profits from his pioneering work. is at stake. Patents on the 
processes by which he has produced and employed the new 
living organism are uot contested. The only question we 
need decide is whether Congress, exercising its authority under 
Art. I , § 8, of the Constitution, intended that he be able to 
secure a monopoly 011 the living organism itself, no matter how 
produced or how used. Because I believe the Court has mis-
read the applicable legislation, I dissent. 
The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Xation 's deep-
seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage 
progress. Deepsouth Packing Co. \'. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 
518, 530-531 (1972); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
7- 10 (1966). Given the complexity and legislative nature of 
this delicate task. we must be careful to extend patent protec-
tion no further thau Congress has provided. In particular, 
were there an absence of legislative direction, the courts should 
leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend 
the patent privilege into areas where the common understand-
ing has been that patents are not available. 1 Cf. D eepsouth . 
Pa(/~ing Co. v. Laitram Curp., supra. 










2 DIA:-10.\"D v. CHAKRABARTY 
In this case, however, we do not confront a complete legisla-
tive vacuum. The sweeping language of the Patent Act of 
1793, as re-ellacted in HJ52. is 11ot the last pronouncement Con-
gress has made in this area . In 1930 Cougress enacted the 
Pla.nt Patent Act affording patent protection to developers of 
certain asexually reproduced plants. In 1970 Congress 
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act to extend protection 
to certain ne,v plant varieties capable of sexual reproduction. 
Thus. we are not dealing-as the Court would have it-with 
the routine problem of " uuantieipated inventions. " Ante, at 
12. In these two Acts Congress has addressed the general 
problem of patenti11g animate inventions and has chosen 
carefully limited language granting protection to some kinds 
of discoveries. but specifically excluding others. These Acts 
strongly evidence a congressioual limitation that excludes bac-
teria from pate11tability.2 
First. the .-.\cts evidence Congress' understanding. at least 
since 1930. that ~ 101 does not include living organisms. If 
llewly developed living organisms not JJaturally occurring had 
been patentable U11der ~ 101. the plants included in the scope 
of the 1930 a11d 1970 Acts could have been patented without 
new legislation. Those plants, like the bacteria involved in 
advueate~ of agri~tural pall'uls, was that liviug orga1ll~m::; werr u11patent-
alJle. See cmtf . at'i!, nnd n . 8. 
2 But PYCH if I agreed with thr Court that t he 1930 and 1970 Act::; \\' Pre 
not di~po;;iti,·P. I would di"~eut. This ea"~ pre::;euts rven more cogent rPa-
sons than Deepsouth Packi11y Co . not to extend tht· pa1ent munopol~· iu 
the face of 1mcertaint~·- . .\ t t he ver~· lea"t, t he::;e Act:; a re ,:ig11,: of lrgis!a-
tiYe alt r ntion to the problrm,- of patenting Jh·ing organi,;m::;, but tlw~· gi,·e 
no nffinnatiw indication uf congre,;,-:ional intent that bacteria be patentablr. 
The ravrat of Parker ,. Fluok . .!37 F. S. 58J, 596 ( 1978) , an admonition 
to "procerd <·a11tiou:<I_,. wheu we are asked 1o rxtend l"1trnt right:; i11 to areas 
wholl~· unfore:;rrn I>~- Co ng;n';-:;,: ," therrforr brcome~ prrtinrnt. I should 
t hink thf' 11 rrr8;:; it~· fur caution i,; that mu ch grPater when we arr ;1:;ked to 
extend patent righ1 ~ into area;; Congre~,; ha,; fure:-:een and con:;idered but 
has not re;;olYed . 
··• -.. - -
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this case, were new varieties not naturally occurring.3 Al-
though the Court, ante, at 7, rejects this line of argument, it 
does not explain why the Acts ,vere necessary unless to correct 
a pre-existing situation.4 I ca.nnot share the Court's implicit 
assumption that Congress was engaged in either idle exercises 
or mere correction of the public record when it enacted the 
1930 and 1970 Acts. And Congress certainly thought it was 
doing something significant. The committee reports contain 
expansive prose about the previously unavailable benefits to 
be derived from extending patent protection to plants." H. R. 
3 The Conrt rrfns to the logic employed b~· Congress in choosing not to 
perpetuate the "dichotom~·" suggested by Secretary Hyde. Ante, at 9. 
But by this logic the bacteria at i;;sue here are distinguishable from a 
"mineral ... crented wholl~· b~· nature" in exactly the same way as were 
the new varietie,- of pl:u1t~. If a 1ww n.ct was needed to provide patent 
protection for the plant~, it was equall~· necessary for bacteria. Yet Con-
gresl" provided for patents on plantf' but. not on these bacteria. In short, 
Congres:s derided to mnke ouly a subset of a11imate '·human-mnde inven-
tions," ibid., patentable. 
4 If the 1930 Act'~ on\~: purposr were to solve the technical problem of 
descriptiou refrrred to by the Court, ante. at 8, most of the Act , and in 
particular its limitation to a;;exually reproduced plants, would have been 
totally unnecessary. 
5 Srcretary Hydr's letter was not the only explicit indicat ion in the legis-
lative history of these Arts that Congress was acting on the assumption 
that legislation was necessa ry to make living organisms patentable. The 
Senate Judiciar~• Committee Report on thr 1970 Art states the Committee's 
under:st.'lnding tha.t patent protection extended no further than the explic'it 
provisions of these Acts: 
"Under the patent law, patent protection is limited to those varieties of 
plants which reproduce asexually. that is, by such methods as grafting or 
budding. No protection is ava ilable to t hose varieties of plants which 
reproduce sexually, that is, by seeds. S. Rep. No. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., 3 (1970). 
Similarly, Representative Poage, speaking for the 1970 Act , after noling 
the protection accorded asexually developed plants, stated that "for plants 
produced from seed, there has been no such protection." 122 Cong. Rec. 
40195 (1970). 
• - 1- ~ -
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Rep. :N'o. 91- 1605. 91st Co11g. , 2d Sess., 1- 3 ( 1970); S. Rep. 
No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (Hl30). Because Congress 
thought it had to legislate i11 order to make agricultural 
"human-made inve11tions" patentable and because the legisla-
tion Congress enacted is limited , it follows that Congress never 
meant to make patentable items outside the scope of the 
legislation. 
Second, the 1970 Act clearly indicates that Congress has 
included bacteria within the focus of its legislative concern, 
but not within th(• scope of patent protection. Congress spe-
cifically excluded bacteria from the coverage of the 1970 Act. 
7 U. S. C. § 2402 (a ) . The Court's attempts to supply ex., 
planations for this explicit exclusion ring hollow. It is true 
that there is no mention in the legislative history of the exclu-
sion, but that does not give us license to invent reasons . . The 
fact is tha.t Congress. assuming that animate objects as to 
which it had uot specifically legislated could not be patentecl1 
,. exch.1~led bacteria .. frorn the set of patentable orgauis1n~, 
' . 
C HAMBE~S O F 
JUSTI C E BYRON R. W HITE 
- -~ttµumt (!Jottt± of tl1t ~ ch ~tafeg 
~fringtcn, gl. QJ. 20,;iJ!,.'.3 
May 28, 1980 
/ 
Re: 79-136 - Diamond v. Chakrabarty, et al 
Dear Bill, 
Ple ase join me in your dissent. 
Sincerely yours, 
Mr. J u stice Brennan 
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near Bill: 
Please add my name to your dlssP-ntinq opinion. 
Mr. Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 




JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
-.§u.prrmt <.qourt of tqt ~b ,jtatu 
'll1asl7ington. ~- <4. 2og;,1~ 
May 28, 1980 
/ 
Re: No. 79-136 - Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
Dear Bill: 
Please join me in your dissent. 
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TO: Mr. Justice Powell 
FROM: David 
DATE: May 29, 1980 
RE: No. 79-136, Diamond v. Chakrabarty 
I would propose adding to the end of Justice Brennan's 
dissent the following paragraph. 
"The Court protests that its holding today is dictated by 
the broad language of§ 101, which "cannot be confined to the 
'particular application[s] • contemplated by the legislators.'" 
Ante, at 12, quoting Barr · v. United States, 324 U.S. 83, 90 (1945). 
But this decision does not follow the unavoidable implications of the 
statute. Rather, it extends the patent system to cover living 
material even though Congress plainly has legislated in the belief 
that § 101 does not encompass living organisms. It is the role of 
Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of the 
~~~ ~~~~~ 1fu 
/"'J,11~,A/&;,~ ~  ~,, 
The ending could be punchier, but I tried to match the 
- somewhat low-key tone struck by Justice Brennan's dissent. 
- -
May 29, 1980 
79- 136 Diamond v . Chakrabarty 
near Ril 1: 
Before I send vou a 101n note 1n your dissent, as I 
exnect to ao, would you cons1der a<ldina to the end of your 
ooinion somethino alonq the followina lines: 
"The Court protests that its holnina today is 
dictated by the broad lanquaoe of~ 101, which 
'cannot he confinea to the "narticular 
aopljcetionfs] ••• contemnlate~ bv the 
leqislPtors."' AntP, at 12, nuotina Rarr v. TTnited 
States, 324 u.~."sr,' 90 (194~). Rut this dec1s1on 
doe$ not follow thP unavojrlable iMnlications of the 
st?tute . Rather, it exten~~ t~e patent svstem to 
cover living material even thouqh Conqress plainly 
has leqislated in the belief that~ 101 does not 
encomposR livina oraanisms. It is the role or 
Conqress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the 
reach of the patent laws. This iR especially true 
wherP., as here, the composition sou~ht to be 
patented uniquely implicates matters of public 
concern." 
I was oersuadea to dissent in this case, in 
significant part at least, by the relative novelty of 
patentina a livinq orqanism, ana by my conviction that the 
issue should be decided by Conqress . Althouqh you have said 
this, I would be somewhat happier if you ma~e it explicit at 
the end of your opinion . 
Sincerely, 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
- -• 
June 2 , 1980 
79-136 Diamond v . Chakrabartv 
Dear Bill: 
Please add my name to your di~sent. 
Mr . Justice Brennan 
lfp/ss 
cc: The Conference 
Sincerely, 
. \ ~ ~-- - To: The Chie:f Justice Mr . Justice Stewart 
/
7 /:1 _ _ _ /J /) Kr. Justice White 
~~~ Mr. Justice Marshall 
J e:::;c:,....&.-.,,,z.~i..-c:~"'-AI Justice Bla,:kmun 
~ Jl<J ~ r. Justice Po·.vell 
\~ - / Mr.
0
Justice RPhnq~tst 
\ Kr. Justice Stevens 
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I Mn. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom Mn. JusTICE 'WHITE and MR. JusTICE MARSHALL join, dissenting. 
I agree with the Court that the question before us is a nar-
row one. Neither the future of scientific research, nor even 
the ability of respondent Chakrabarty to reap some monopoly 
profits from his pioneering work, is at stake. Patents on the 
processes by which he has produced and employed the new 
living organism are not contested. The only question we 
need decide is whether Congress, exercising its authority under 
Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, intended that he be able to 
secure a monopoly on the living organism itself, no matter how 
produced or how used. Because I believe the Court has mis-
read the applicable legislation, I dissent. 
The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation 's deep-
seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage 
progress. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U. S. 
518, 530-531 (1972); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U. S. 1, 
7-10 (1966) . Given the complexity a.nd legislative nature of 
this delicate task, we must be careful to extend patent protec-
tion no further than Congress has provided. In particular, 
were there an absence of legislative direction , the courts should 
leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend 
the patent privilege into areas where the common understand~ 
ing has been that patents are not available.1 Cf. Deepsouth 
Packing Co. v. Laitram Curp. , supra. 
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In this case, however, we do not confront a complete legisla-
tive vacuum. The sweeping language of the Patent Act of 
1793, as re-enacted in 1952, is not the last pronouncement Con-
gress has made in this area. In 1930 Congress enacted the 
Plant Patent Act affording patent protection to developers of 
certain asexually reproduced plants. In 1970 Congress 
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act to extend protection 
to certain new plant varieties capable of sexual reproduction. 
Thus, we are not dealing-as the Court would have it-with 
the routine problem of "unanticipated inventions." Ante, at 
12. In these two Acts Congress has addressed the general 
problem of patenting animate inventions and has chosen 
carefully limited language granting protection to some kinds 
of discoveries, but specifically excluding others. These Acts 
strongly evidence a congressional limitation that excludes bac-
teria from patentability.2 
First, the Acts evidence Congress' understanding, at least 
since 1930, that § 101 does not include living organisms. If 
newly developed living organisms not naturally occurring had 
been patentable under § 101, the plants included in the scope 
of the 1930 and 1970 Acts could have been patented without 
new legislation. Those plants, like the bacteria involved in 
advocates of agricultural patents, was that living organisms were unpatent-
able. See ante, at 7-8, and n. 8. 
2 But even if I agreed with the Court that the 1930 and 1970 Acts were 
not dispositive, I would dissent . This case presents even more cogent rea-
sons than Deepsouth Packing Co. not to extend the patent monopoly in 
the face of uncertainty. At the very least, these Acts are signs of legisla-
tive attention to the problems of patenting living organisms, but they give 
no affirmative indication of congressional intent that bacteria be patentable. 
The caveat of Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978), an admonition 
to "proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas 
wholly unforeseen by Congress," therefore becomes pertinent . I should 
think the necessity for caution is that much greater when we are asked to 
extend patent rights into areas Congress has foreseen and considered but 
:\las not resolved·. 
' " -
79-136-DISSENT 
DIAMOND v. CHAKRABARTY 
-
3 
this case, were new varieties not naturally occurring.3 Al-
though the Court, ante, at 7, rejects this line of argument, it 
does not explain why the Acts were necessary unless to correct 
a pre-existing situation."'" I cannot share the Court's implicit 
assumption that Congress was engaged in either idle exercises 
or mere correction of the public record when it enacted the 
1930 and 1970 Acts. And Congress certainly thought it was 
doing something significant. The committee reports contain 
expansive prose about the previously unavailable benefits to 
be derived from extending patent protection to plants." H. R. 
3 The Court refers to tlw logir cmplo~recl by Congres.~ in choosing not to 
perpetuate the "dichotomy" H1ggcsted by Secreta ry Hyde. Ante, at 9. 
But by this logic the bacteria at i,-sue here are di,-tiuguishable from a 
"mineral ... created wholly by nature" in exactly the same way as were 
the new varieties of plants. If a new act was needed to provide patent 
protection for the plants, it was equally necessa ry for bacteria. Yet Con-
gress provided for patents on plants but not on these bacteria. In short, 
Congress decided t.o make only a subset of animate "huma11-made inven-
tions," ibid .. patentable. 
4 If the 1930 Act 's only purpose were to solve the technical problem of 
description referred to by the Court, ante, at 8, most of the Act, and in 
pa1iicular its limitation to asexually reproduced plants, would ham been 
totally unnecessary. 
6 Secreta ry Hyde's letter was not the only explicit indication in the legis-
lative history of these Acts tha.t Congress was act ing on the assumption 
that legislation was necessa ry to make living organi::;ms patentable. The 
Sena te Judiciary Committee Report on the 1970 Act states the Committee's 
understanding tha.t pa.tent protection extended no further than t he explicit 
provisions of these Acts : 
"Under the patent law, patent protection is limited to those varieties of 
plants which reproduce asexually, that is, by such methods as grafting or 
budding. No protect ion is available to those varieties of plants which 
reproduce sexually, that is, by seeds. S. Rep. No. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., 3 (1970). 
Similarly, Repre;;entative Poage, speaking for the 1970 Act, a.fter noting 
the protection accorded asexually developed plants, stated that "for plants 
produced from seed, t here has been no such protection." 122 Cong. Rec. 
402()5 (1970). 
' ... .. -
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Rep. No. 91-1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1970); S. Rep. 
fo. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1930). Because Congress. 
f.~ought it had to legislate in order to make agricultural 
'human-made inventions" patentable and because the legisla-
tion Congress enacted is limited, it follows that Congress never 
meant to make patentable items outside the scope of the 
legislation. 
Second, the 1970 Act clea.rly indicates that Congress has 
included bacteria within the focus of its legislative concern, 
but not within the scope of patent protection. Congress spe-
cifically excluded bacteria from the coverage of the 1970 Act. 
7 U. S. C. § 2402 (a). The Court's attempts to supply ex~ 
planations for this explicit exclusion ring hollow. It is true 
that there is no mention in the legislative history of the exclu-
sion, but that does not give us license to invent reasons. The 
fact is that Congress, assuming that animate objects as to 
which it had not specifically legislated could not be patented, 
excluded bacteria from the set of patentable organisms. 
The Court protests that its holding today is dictated by 
the broad language of § 101, which "cannot be confined to the 
'particular application [s] ... contemplated by the legisla-
tors.'" Ante, at 12, quoting Barr v. United States, 324 U. S. 
83, 90 (1945). But as I have shown , the Court's decision does 
not follow the unavoidable implications of the statute. 
Rather, it extends the patent system to cover living material 
even though Congress plainly has legislated in the belief that 
§ 101 does not encompass living organisms. It is the role of 
Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of 
the patent laws. This is especially true where. as here. the 
composition sought to be patented uniquely implicates matters 
of public concern. 
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MR. JusTICE BRENNAN, with whom MR JusTICE WHITE, 
MR. JusTICE MARSHALL, and MR. JUSTICE PowELL join, 
dissenting. 
I agree with the Court that the question before us is a nar-
row one. Neither the future of scientific research, nor even 
the ability of respondent Chakrabarty to reap some monopoly 
profits from his pioneering work, is at stake. Patents on the 
processes by which he has produced and employed the new 
living organism are not contested. The only question we 
need decide is whether Congress, exercising its authority under 
Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution, intended that he be able to 
secure a monopoly on the living organism itself, no matter how 
produced or how used. Because I believe the Court has mis-
read the applicable legislation, I dissent. 
The patent laws attempt to reconcile this Nation's deep-
seated antipathy to monopolies with the need to encourage 
progress. Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 
518, 530-531 (1972); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 
7-10 (1966). Given the complexity and legislative nature of 
this delicate task, we must be careful to extend patent protec-
tion no further tban ·congress has provided. In particular, 
were there an absence of legislative direction , the courts should 
leave to Congress the decisions whether and how far to extend 









DIAMOND v. CHAKRABARTY 
-
ing has been that patents are not available.1 Cf. Deepsouth 
facking Co. v. Laitram Curp., supra. 
In this case, however, we do not confront a complete legisla-
tive vacuum. The sweeping language of the Patent Act of 
1793, as re-enacted in 1952, is not the last pronouncement Con-
gress has made in this area. In 1930 Congress enacted the 
Plant Patent Act affording patent protection to developers of 
certain asexually reproduced plants. In 1970 Congress 
enacted the Plant Variety Protection Act to extend protection 
to certain new plant varieties capable of sexual reproduction. 
Thus, we are not dealing-as the Court would have it-with 
the routine problem of "unanticipated inventions." Ante, at 
12. In these two Acts Congress has addressed the general 
l>roblem of patenting animate inventions and has chosen 
qarefully limited language granting protection to some kinds 
«,f discoveries, but specifically excluding others. These Acts 
fjtrongly evidence a congressional limita.tion that excludes bac-
teria from patentability.2 
First, the Acts evidence Congress' understanding, at least 
since 1930, that § 101 does not include living organisms. If 
newly developed living organisms not naturally occurring had 
been patentable under § 101, the plants included in the scope 
1 I read the Court to admit that the popular conception, even among 
advocates of agricultural patents, was that living organisms were unpatent-
able. See ante, at 7-8, and n. 8. 
2 But even if I agreed with the Court that the 1930 and 1970 Acts were 
not dispositive, I would dissent. This case presents even more cogent rea-
sons than Deepsouth Packing Co. not to extend the patent monopoly in 
the face of uncertainty. At the very least, these Acts are signs of legisla-
tive attention to the problems of patenting living organisms, but they iriYe 
no affirmative indication of congressional intent that bacteria be patentable. 
The caveat of Parker v. Flook, 437 U. S. 584, 596 (1978), an admonition 
to "proceed cautiously when we are asked to extend patent rights into areas 
wholly unforeseen by Congress," therefore becomes pertinent. I should 
think the necessity for caution is that much greater when we are asked to 
extend patent rights into areas Congress has foreseen and considered but 
ha~ pot .resolved, 
. . - -
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of the 1930 and 1970 Acts could have been patented without 
new legislation. Those plants. like the bacteria involved in 
this case, were new varieties not naturally occurring.3 Al-
though the Court, ante, at 7, rejects this line of argument, it 
does not explain why the Acts were necessary unless to correct 
a pre-existing sltuation.4 I cannot share the Court's implicit 
assumption that Congress was engaged in either idle exercises 
or mere correction of the public record when it enacted the 
1930 and 1970 Acts. And Congress certainly thought it was 
doing something significant. The committee reports contain 
expansive prose about the previously unavailable benefits to 
be derived from extending patent protection to plants." H. R. 
s The Court ref Prs to the logic employed by Congress in choosing not to 
perpetuate the "dichotomy" suggested by Secretary Hyde. Ante, at 9. 
But by this logic the bacteria at issue here are distinguishable from a 
"mineral . . . created wholly by nature" in exactly the same way as were 
t he new varieties of plants. If a new act. was needed to provide patent 
protection for the plants, it was equally necessary for bacteria . Yet Con-
gress providf'd for patents on plants but not on these ba.cteria. In short, 
Congress deciclccl to make only a subset of animate "human-made inven-
tions," ibid., patentable. 
4 If the 1930 Act's only purpose were to solve the technical problem of 
description referred to by the Court, ante, at. 8, most of the Act, and in 
particular its limitation to asexually reproduced plants, would have been 
totally unnecessary. 
5 Secretary Hyde's letter was not, the only explicit indication in the legis-
lative history of these Acts t hat Congress was acting on the assumption 
that legislation was necessary to make living organisms patentable. The 
Senate Judiciary Committee Report on the 1970 Act states the Committee's 
W1derstanding that patent protection extended no further than the explicit 
provisions of these Acts: 
"Under the patent law, patent protection is limited to those varieties of 
plants which reproduce asexually, that is, by such methods as grafting or 
budding. No protection is available to those varieties of plants which 
reproduce sexually, that is, by seeds. S. Rep. No. 91-1246, 91st Cong., 
2d Sess., 3 ( 1970). 
Similarly, Representative Poage, speaking for the 1970 Act, after noting 
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Rep. No. 91-1605, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1970); S. Rep. 
No. 315, 71st Cong., 2d Sess., 1-3 (1930). Because Congress 
thought it had to legislate in order to make agricultural 
"human-made inventions" patentable and because the legisla.,. 
tion Congress enacted is limited, it follows that Congress never 
meant to make patentable items outside the scope of the 
legislation. 
Second, the 1970 Act clearly indicates that Congress has 
included bacteria within the focus of its legislative concern, 
but not within the scope of patent protection. Congress spe-
cifica1ly excluded bacteria from the coverage of the 1970 Act. 
7 U. S. C. § 2402 (a). The Court's attempts to supply ex-
planations for this explicit exclusion ring hollow. It is true 
that there is no mention in the legislative history of the exclu-
sion, but that does not give us license to invent reasons. The 
fact is that Congress, assuming that animate objects as to 
hich .it had not specifically legislated could not be patented, 
j. xcluded bacteria from the set of patentable organisms. The Court protests that its holding today is dicta.ted by 
the broad language of ~ 101, which "cannot be confined to the 
'particular application [s] ... contemplated by the legisla-
tors.' " Ante, at 12, quoting Barr v. United States, 324 U. S. 
83, 90 (1945). But as I have shown , the Court's decision does 
not follow the unavoidable implications of the statute. 
Rather, it extends the patent system to cover living material 
even though Congress plainly has legislated in the belief that 
§ 101 does not encompass living organisms. It is the role of 
Congress, not this Court, to broaden or narrow the reach of 
the patent laws. This is especially true where, as here, the 
composition sought to be patented uniquely implicates matter 
of public concern. 
produced from seed, th.ere has b,een no such protection." 122 Cong. Rec. 
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